and representatives of the same nation, totalling several millions, are hard by in Iran, Syria, and Turkey. There is some cause for apprehension as there have been no less than six armed Kurdish rebellions, some common to several of the four governments involved and quelled with difficulty, in the past twenty-five years. As in the case of most of the population, the royal family of Iraq is Arab and the language of government is Arabic. The spectre of Kurdish nationalism strikes terror in the hearts of government officials, and there is little love lost between Arab and Kurd. Many of the Kurds regard the Arabs as unlawful rulers, at the same time scorning them for the poverty and filth to be found in southern Iraq. "Are you an Arab?" a Kurdish man or woman often challenges a dirty child of the village, "Go wash yourself." On their part, the Arabs, particularly those of the upper classes, following the tradition of Xenophon, regard the Kurds with a mixture of fear and disgust. "Why do you waste your time with those people?" the investigator was asked by an Arab official, "they are all bandits." In spite of these things, there is no bar to intermarriage between the two groups, and any Kurd can rise to great prominence in the government service, although he is a priori under suspicion. In 1951 two of the fourteen provinces in Iraq were directed by Kurdish governors, and the command of the army unit at Rowanduz was for a time given to a Kurdish staff officer.

In addition, there is a certain amount of rivalry between persons of different provinces or cities, for

lower classes enters upon a new and loftier status, becoming a gentleman. Never again is he allowed to engage in menial labor, nor the uses of his inferiors. Only certain occupations are open to him, the government service, the professions, and, to a lesser extent, business. It is the hope and dream of every father and mother of the lower classes that one or more of their sons will be educated, and thus honor them, and they endure great sacrifices to this end, sometimes ill-repaid by the young official who scorns their plebeian manners and dress. For this very reason the bureaucracy is heavily overburdened with men whose training does not permit them to return to "degrading" toil, and every year the number of applicants increases. For most, business has little attraction, the province of foreigners, Christians, and Jews, but it must be admitted that some Muslim families who have interested themselves in this way have proven much more enterprising and ruthless than their rivals of other religions and nations. Occupying the uppermost strata of this system are the highest government officials and officers, wealthy landlords, some of whom possess huge estates, and others of a similar nature, politicians, lawyers, and physicians. The middle class, of course, includes the lesser government personnel, educators, business and professional men. The lower class begins with uneducated merchants and craftsmen and descends to the masses. There is no well-defined line of demarcation between these groups, save that which separates the educated and uneducated. There is also no bar to mobility, and the son of the poorest

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peasant, by dint of education and enterprise, may rise to the highest ministry in the state. However, those families already in the upper classes, through wealth and influence, tend to retain their hold. As far as intermarriage is concerned, mates are sought who are equal to or higher in status than the person in question. It has been said that there is only one definite cleavage, but there is also a very fine sense of equality in terms of relative wealth and rank. It is possible for a man of the upper class of this system to marry into the hereditary aristocracy, and for a chieftain to take a wife from among the daughters of some official or officer, but, insofar as the aristocratic rank is patrilineal, there is no danger to the proud lineages in question. On the whole, there seems to be far less stringency in matters of marriage in this system than in the first. A successful lawyer, for example, a peasant by birth, might marry the daughter of a minister, but the daughter of a chieftain can never wed a successful peasant.

It would be incorrect to assign the Muslim clergy, the mullas of the Sunnites and the imams of the Shiites, to any particular horizon in the two systems, for they are to be found in almost all classes of society. They are literate, of course, inasmuch as it is necessary to be able to read the Quran, but there is some suspicion that a few have acquired chapter and verse by ear alone, without fully understanding the art of reading. An amusing [522]

it has had a new class added to its society, that of the officials and officers, and, more than any agricultural village, has been absorbed into an unfamiliar system. The government elite of the town are on an equal footing, as far as prestige is concerned, with the local aristocracy and enjoy the advantage of having the real power. Already certain changes, which might have been anticipated, are beginning to take place. A few merchants in the town have adopted the European dress of the official class, and men are determined that their sons, if humanly possible, will be educated and take a higher place in the new hierarchy of society, something previously impossible. It is in Rowanduz, then, that a new social structure is being realised as it is elsewhere, for example, among the Marsh Arabs of the southern provinces. It is one of the state of Iraq, rather than the tribal and feudal system which is characterized by the absolute difference between aristocrat and commoner. At present, the contest between the government and the Kurdish nobility has only been partially decided, but, failing some major event, it seems probable that the Kurdish chieftains will be eliminated as a distinctive class and be able to save themselves only as landowners and participants in the new regime.

The relevance of the second object of this study to ethnology is not that it has formulated something new or unique, but that it supplements the large body of material already gathered on the transition of primitive into

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misleading to speal of an inclusive church organization in the sense one knows it in the West. The actual qualifications of individual mullahs vary tremendously, and financial arrangements for the support of the Mosque are, as far as village mosques are concerned, entirely in the hands of the local community. Yet traditionalism and informal controls give a certain unity and enforce certain limits on deviations from a vague norm.

The position as mullah is an achieved status with completely open recruitment. Succesful application to the study of the Koran leads eventually to initiation. There is a tendency for *Sheikhs* and *Sayyids* to be over-represented, but this seems primarily due to a higher frequency of religious inclinations, resulting from their automatic bias in orientation. Frequently a derwish will be willing to support his son through some or all of the necessary years of reading and study, and thus achieve for the son what was beyond the reach of the father. At times, through an early interest in the teachings of the village mullah, a boy in a secularly oriented family will find his way into the religious field. A striking number of the students are blind, and dependin their studies on the help of their friends.

The traditional pattern is for the student to spend an unspecified number of years running from mosque to mosque, seeking out the teachers of high route and remaining with each for whatever length of time he wishes (see Appendix III). In this period, as well as studying the Koran and the legal interpretation of the text, the student should become familiar with other religious writing, in Persian as well as in Arabic. Finally, when the student and whatever teacher he happens to be with at the time feels he is prepared, he is made to give a sermon, and after a ritual is given the white headdress of the mullah, as well as a diploma confirming his status.

During his studies, the future mullah is dependent on his family or on individual charity for his subsistence. Later, as a full-fleged mullah, he must make whatever arrangements he can. The positions in the mosques of the towns are now government supported, but in the village the office is supported by local resources only. The community expresses its wish to have a mullah and the extent of its ability to pay — generally by revenue on dedicated land and a